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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to outline how the Department of Defense (DoD), through 
Cyber Command, can holistically incorporate the cybersecurity of both DoD and non-DoD 
critical infrastructure into its cyber operations framework. 
The United States and the DoD rely on critical infrastructure for basic life support to both 
civilians and the Armed Forces members tasked with the defense of this nation.  Critical 
infrastructure is made up of industrial controls systems that fall under the taxonomy of 
operational technology (OT).  In the 2018 Cyber Strategy, the DoD has been charged with 
defending both DoD and non-DoD critical infrastructure in a more aggressive posture to “defend 
forward.”  To do this, the DoD needs to incorporate cybersecurity of critical infrastructure into 
the DoD’s holistic cybersecurity plan.  However, the DoD has yet to address who will assume 
this mission, and how it will be accomplished.  This research seeks to answer these questions and 
the reasons leading up to the DoD’s sudden change in policy.  
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On August 24th, 2012, General Ray Odierno was quoted “The strength of our nation is 
our Army.  The strength of our Army is our soldiers.  The strength of our soldiers is our 
families” (Odierno, 2012).  The emphasis on the nation’s strength is outlined from the Army to 
the family.  Yet so much of our national strength operates under the assumption that our critical 
infrastructure is available, operational, and secure.  The world is entering a more complex future 
environment complicated by economic, military, and political uncertainty.  Competition for 
resources, influence, wealth, and legitimacy generates unexpected and expected opportunists 
from nation-states, terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, hacktivist and other threat 
egents (Odierno, 2012).  Threat agents are creating an asymmetric strategic environment, 
exploiting the information domain through innovative uses of computer technology.  The 
information age has become a data-hungry environment.  The need for real time data has 
extended to the United States’ critical infrastructure.  The Patriot Act defines critical 
infrastructure as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States 
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of 
those matters” (DHS, 2015).  Our critical infrastructure is run by Operational Technology (OT) 
that is susceptible to attack by threat agents looking to exploit vulnerabilities in our industrial 
control system.  In order for the United States to maintain a competitive advantage, it is 




1.2 Problem Statement 
The cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructure is of national importance and has 
come under the spotlight in recent years due to the large threat impact it could have on the safety 
of the nation and its people.  However, securing these aging industrial control system has proven 
to be difficult as Information Technology (IT) increasingly gets incorporated into the OT 
domain.  Industrial control systems running power, water, wastewater, and others use proprietary 
systems running legacy operating systems and protocols from the 1990s.  In the early turn of the 
century, these control systems were exposed to the internet through an increasing demand for 
real-time information (Knapp & Langili, 2014).  The high cost coupled with the inability to 
power down due to safety and/or environmental regulations makes updating critical 
infrastructure challenging (Conklin, 2016).  The 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy states its 
responsibility to defend both DoD and non-DoD critical infrastructure as a top priority.  
Understanding industrial control systems, current security posture, and inherited vulnerabilities, 
are critical if the DoD is to defend it.   The purpose of this thesis is to outline how the DoD, 
through Cyber Command, can holistically incorporate the cybersecurity of both DoD and non-











The differences in goals, objectives, and security measures were taken in enterprises that 
utilize OT are different when compared to IT.  IT is the study or use of systems (especially 
computers and telecommunications) for storing, retrieving, and sending information (Google, 
n.d.).  OT is the hardware and software that monitor and/or control a physical process (Gartner, 
n.d.).  In IT, the focus is on the protection of critical business information.  IT is driven by data, 
whereas OT is driven by the operational capability of a system to control a process, and the 
protection of critical plant safety and productivity.      
OT typically uses ladder logic and relay logic in its programmable logic controllers 
(PLC).  Examples of OT range from air conditioners and garage doors to the industrial control 
systems in electric and nuclear facilities.  Components found in OT for industrial control systems 
include remote terminal units, safety instrumented systems, intelligent electronic devices, 
human-machine interfaces, variable frequency drives, data historians, programmable automation 
controllers, and others (Conklin, 2016).  These components work together to monitor and control 
actuators and sensors.  Valves, pumps, motors and other equipment under control (EUC)/field 
devices, are used to regulate temperature, pressure, position, and levels to control a process.  OT 
networks were once run with proprietary hardware and software not commonly known to others 
unless they had specific training and experience with that control system (Bodungen, Singer, 
Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017). 
 
2.1 UNDERSTANDING OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY  
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For consistency and clarity in understanding critical infrastructure, operational 










Critical infrastructure refers to the industries that provide water, power, sewage, etc.  
Industrial control systems describe the technology used in critical infrastructure.  When 
discussing industrial control systems, generally professionals refer to one of two main types of 
industrial control systems:  Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and distributed 
control system (DCS).  Both are control system architectures that use computers, networks, and 
human-machine interfaces for supervisory management (Conklin 2016).  The difference lies in 
that SCADA provides centralized control functions for industrial control systems that are 
geographically dispersed and DCS distributes the control functions across a wide range of 
controllers that are generally contained within four walls (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & 
Wilhoit, 2017).  The term “control systems” are used in a general sense of OT specific 
automation and are found everywhere.  A refrigerator would be an example of a control system.  
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Figure 2-1 Echelons of Critical Infrastructure 
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infrastructure.  An example of an industrial control system would be the United States’ electric 
power grid which spans coast to coast and is the world’s largest machine (Aggarwal, 2014).   
 
2.2.1 Historical Summary of Operational Technology 
Industrial control systems started with PLC’s, a digital computer adapted as high-
reliability automation controller for industrial control systems (Conklin, 2016).  PLCs started out 
as hardwired relay systems that could be updated in person, with a few hundred lines of code 
from a tape cartridge (Zetter, 2014).  These first PLCs were first developed in the 1960s for the 
automotive industry (Pawar & Bhasme, 2016).  The United States began seeing distributed 
control systems by Honeywell in the 1970s (Greenplant, 2011).  Minicomputers and 
microprocessors replaced mainframes up through the 1980s (Conklin, 2016).  Security concerns 
were limited due to the required intimate knowledge of the control system.  In the 1990s, 
Congress passed environmental laws to regulate factory emissions.  The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) required the electric companies to monitor energy, output, and 
distribution.  The need for up-to-date data and regulatory requirements pushed control system 
operators/owners to use commercial operating systems such as Microsoft and UNIX (Zetter, 
2014).  Thus the 1990s introduced the use of dial-up modems for remote connectivity to critical 
infrastructure.  As OT systems and networks progress into the next century, the trend continues 
to move to open protocols, commercial off the shelf operating systems, and wireless (Conklin, 
2016).  Since the 1990s, industrial control systems have come under increased scrutiny 
concerning their security.  The United States government has seen fit make critical infrastructure 
a priority in terms of national security.   
2.2 OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES 
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2.2.2 General Operational Technology Challenges: 
Providing security in OT is fraught with challenges on all fronts. Widespread 
implementation of Microsoft and UNIX operating systems in the OT environment has left the 
nation’s critical infrastructure vulnerable to threats predominately seen in IT networks alone 
(Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  OT systems run on operating systems that 
cannot be shut down for updates and patches because of environmental regulations and the 
negative impacts it can have on OT devices.  Therefore, traditional cybersecurity best practices 
such as Microsoft Security Updates, antivirus, and patches are typically not done (Conklin, 
2014).  In addition, control system devices, protocols, and applications have not been inherently 
designed with security in mind, such as authentication, encryption, or other common 
countermeasures (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).      
A control system’s primary focus is to strive for efficiency and reliability.  OT protocols 
typically forgo any feature or function that is not absolutely necessary.  Again, this includes 
security features like authentication and encryption which require additional overhead.  Below 
provides a quick review of common control system protocols widely used in industry but should 
not be seen in IT networks.  Those protocols are ModBus, DNP3.0, and ICCP. 
ModBus:  An open-source, messaging protocol often used between a supervisory 
computer and Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) (master-slave/client-server) and is 
commonly considered the de facto standard protocol for the control systems environment 
(ModBus, 2018).  It is an application layer protocol and is used to communicate with 
simple devices.  It uses only three Protocol Data Units (PDUs): Modbus request, Modbus 
response, and Modbus exception response (Knapp, 2018).  If using Modbus, each device 
must be assigned a unique address as each command is addressed to a specific device or 
Modbus address.  PDUs contain the Modbus address, function codes, and 
response/request to give the device-specific commands (Knapp, 2018). 
Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3.0):  Primarily used to send and receive messages 
between control system devices.  DNP3.0 is an open-source, standards-based messaging 
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protocol.  DNPs can be encapsulated in Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets to enable RTU communications over IP based 
networks.  This functionality enables DNP3.0 interoperability between master control 
stations and slave (outstations) for the electric utility industry (DNP 2012).  DNP3.0 
started out in electric but is now widely used in water, oil, and gas industries (DNP, 
2012).  It supports time-stamped and time-synchronized data for efficient and reliable 
real-time transmissions. DNP3.0 conducts cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) for data 
reliability (Knapp, 2018). 
Inter Control Center Protocol (ICCP): An open-source, standards-based protocol 
designed for communication over wide area networks (WAN) between a utility control 
center and other (different) control centers, power plants, substations, etc. within the 
energy industry (Knapp, 2018).  It enables many disparate control centers and facilities 
(like electric) to be able to communicate beyond the boundaries of individual utilities 
(Knapp, 2018).  It can be and is used in load balancing between different electric 
companies.  ICCP operates over any network protocol, including TCP/IP (Knapp, 2018). 
OT is fundamentally different than IT.  The ecosystem that drives OT vs IT causes 
security concerns for the nation’s critical infrastructure.  Identifying and understanding some of 
the basic OT concepts and protocols currently in use throughout industry will prove invaluable in 
accomplishing the DoD’s mission in defending the nations critical infrastructure.  However, this 
research paper in no way advocates for Cyber Command to take full ownership of securing 
industrial control systems, but rather to enhance the security and resiliency of owner and 
operator industrial control systems.   
2.2.3 General Operational Technology Security Challenges: 
Broadly examining the table below, there is clearly a need to understand the disparity 




Table 2-1 IT Security vs. Control System Security (Conklin, 2017) 
 
   
The disparity in IT and OT security is readily apparent when comparing availability, 
support, patching, technology lifetime, and others addressed in table 2-1.  These security topics 
are governed by principles used in both IT and OT networks.  Cybersecurity in IT consists of 
three principle concepts (in order of priority): confidentiality, integrity, and availability- called 
CIA.  IT defines confidentiality in terms of secrecy and unauthorized disclosure. Integrity is the 
assurance of the accuracy, reliability, and unauthorized modification of information.  Availability 
is the access to data and resources by authorized individuals (Harris, 2013).  
In OT, these principle security concepts must be redefined.  In the OT ecosystem, these 
principle concepts are flipped, rather than CIA it is AIC.  Availability takes priority, followed by 
integrity, and then confidentiality (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  However, 





ensuring continuity of services produced by the control system.  Integrity relates to the quality of 
data and the control of data flow in the control system.  Historically, confidentiality was rarely 
considered in OT.  With the onset of smart grids and IT and OT convergence, the importance of 
this security principle should increase.  AIC together ensures a safe, reliable, and productive 
control system.  Safety, reliability, and productivity are driven by policy, procedures, and people.  
It is imperative for Cyber Command to understand the goals and objectives for OT 
security and how they integrate into that framework.  To determine key security objectives, an 
OT cybersecurity professional must first determine the requirements.  Ultimately, the 
requirements will drive policy.  The policy must be specific to the control system.  The system as 
designed, the system as deployed with a solution that can be controlled (Conklin, 2018). 
 2.3.1 The Purdue Model: 
The Purdue Model is the industry solution that achieves AIC and is seen as the most 
optimal method for organizing and controlling data flow of OT systems in a secure way.  In a 
proof of concept, the Purdue Model is typically broken down into six layers, starting with layer 
Figure 2-2 OT Security Principles 
DRIVEN BY 
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five, the enterprise layer, continuing to layer zero, the process area. For security reasons, 
industrial control facilities segregate their network into zones to control what goes into the OT 
network and what comes out.  For simplicity, if Cyber Command were to operate in DoD and 
non DoD critical infrastructure, it would be in the enterprise security zone.  The following 
Purdue Model offers a graphical representation of how security is logically organized: 
Enterprise Zone, Layer 5:  The Enterprise Network Layer is comprised of typical 
software and hardware seen in IT ecosystems.  These IT systems are used to govern 
multiple sites, Enterprises, or facilities that govern the overall supply and production 
generated by demand (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).    
Enterprise Zone, Layer 4:  In layer 4, facilities conduct business planning and logistics 
at the individual site.  These are IT systems located at each individual site or facility that 
control the operation of that facility. Its primary function is to measure the performance 
against the production schedule (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).    
DMZ: In-between layer 4 and layer 3 is the DMZ.  The DMZ is a military term used in 
the industry that stands for demilitarized zone.  The Purdue Model does not consider the 
Figure 2-3 Purdue Model (Williams, 1989) 
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DMZ a separate layer.  However, in an industrial control system DMZ, special equipment 
is used to separate and share information between the IT and OT Networks. Systems 
found in the DMZ include patch management servers, replication servers, engineering 
workstations, and change management systems. The purpose of this is to exchange 
critical information between the IT and OT networks without compromising the integrity, 
safety, and operation of the OT Network (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 
2017).    
Manufacturing Zone, Layer 3:  Layer 3 resides firmly in the OT side of the network.  It 
has operator level interaction with the control system.  Operators perform a supervisory 
role where process events are monitored (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 
2017).    
Supervisory LAN, Layer 2:  In layer 2, operators have local control over an individual 
area of a process.  Operators use human-machine interfaces (HMI) to monitor and 
respond to alarms (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  HMI’s give a 
graphical representation of the controlled environment to the operator and are used for 
control, monitoring, and alarming (Conklin, 2016). 
Basic Control or Controller LAN, Layer 1:  Basic control or Basic Process Control 
Systems (BPCS) is a generic term that references PLC, Variable Frequency Drives 
(VFD), sensors, actuators, relays and any other non-safety related control system used to 
control the process (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  VFD is a layer 1 
device used to control the frequency and voltage applied to drives to manipulate their 
speed and direction of operation (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017). 
Layer 1 devices are non-safety related control system controllers that receive input from 
EUC or field devices. (Ahmed, Naedele, Obermeier, & Richard, 2012).  
Bus Network or Process Area, Layer 0:  This layer focuses on equipment under control 
(EUC) from layer 1.  (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  EUCs are 
individual field devices that are connected via a bus network (Ahmed, Naedele, 
Obermeier, & Richard, 2012).  Examples are the drives, motors, valves, and other 
components in the PLC or VFD.   
Finally, the Purdue Model outlines a safety layer. Depending on which version of the 
Purdue Model being referenced, the safety layer can be found in multiple areas, however, the 
safety layer is really incorporated in all layers of the Purdue Model to ensure the safety, 
reliability, and productivity of the control system. Ultimately the safety layer is responsible for 
mitigating anything that could result in the compromised availability and integrity of the 
12 
industrial control system.  Compromised availability and integrity is defined in loss of view, 
control, or manipulation of the industrial control system (Conklin 2017).  Typical components or 
devices found in the safety layer include interlocks and Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS).  
These safety devices are software or firmware encoded responses to a control system in an out of 
tolerance state.  For example, SIS’s are found in key areas of control systems to ensure the 
system brings the process to a safe state (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017). 
2.3.2 Top 20 for ICS: 
While the Purdue model is a way of logically organizing control processes in a secure 
way, Top 20 for ICS discusses the practical implementation of achieving AIC.  It is originally 
derived from the Center for Internet Security top 20 controls implemented in IT ecosystems 
(CIS, 2018).  Again, security principles must be redefined in OT.  While the top 20 controls for 
IT may not be a 100% fit for OT, many of the same principles still apply.  Influenced by the 
Center for Internet Security’s top 20 controls, Dr. William A. Conklin, Associate Professor with 
the College of Technology with the University of Houston has a top 20 for industrial control 
systems. 
1 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices 
2 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software 
3 Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers 
4 Secure Network Engineering – enables the ability to control data flow (enclaves) 
5 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services 
6 Boundary Defense 
7 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges 
8 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Security Audit Logs 
9 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps 
10 Incident Response Capability 
11 Malware Defenses 
12 Data Recovery Capability 
13 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches 
14 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises 
13 
15 Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know 
16 Account Monitoring and Control 
17 Data Loss Prevention 
18 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation 
19 Application Software Security – whitelist 
20 Wireless Device Control 
management.  Change management is the documented authorized changes to the network and/or 
system.  This is crucial for IT ecosystems, where it can be complex and difficult to manage in 
larger organizations due to the short lifetime of equipment and software of about three to five 
years.  However, due to the extended lifetime in OT, change management isn’t as complicated 
and a complete listing of all used hardware and software need to be accurate.  Security 
professionals cannot secure a system or the software operating in OT if there is no accountability 
or documentation of it.  As stipulated earlier, control systems are using legacy operating systems 
and devices with exceptionally long lifespans and thus critical that software and hardware are 
configured as safely as possible.  Implementation of inherent security that is available provides a 
more layered defensive security regardless of how minimal.  Controls four through eight segway 
into the Purdue Model’s domain and assist OT security professionals in engineering the control 
system in a logical, secure manner.  Simply put, OT should be segmented as securely as possible 
from IT, while accounting for all deterministic data flows.  While Top 20 for ICS controls seem 
elementary in thought, and seen as common sense, they are listed as a priority to address 
common security measures that are not being implemented.  
Cyber Command is very familiar in operating in the IT domain, not in OT.  The underline 
focus must be that in OT, nothing is more important than the safe, continued operation of a 
Table 2-2 Top 20 for ICS (Conklin, 2018) 
Like IT, the first two controls are the same and are critical for an organization’s change 
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Table 2-3 Top 5 Risk Assessment Tasks (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017) 
system.  Top 20 for ICS provides actionable guidance to making critical infrastructure more 
resilient.  
2.3.3 Risk Assessments: 
As most OT systems are specific in nature, it is difficult to have a commonly accepted 
risk metric for industrial control systems.   Business objectives and operational environments are 
diverse, and defining risk metrics should be specifically tailored to the operating environment 
(Conklin, 2017).  DoD critical infrastructure should balance mission needs, with functional and 
operational safety.  Different DoD locations have various key assets with various levels of 
importance.  Policies, procedures, and security controls should all be considered when 
developing feasible risk assessments.  Industrial control system security professionals have listed 
5 critical tasks: 
1 Identify what needs to be protected. 
2 Prioritize identified assets according to mission requirements and objectives. 
3 Identify potential risks. 
4 Measure the likelihood of occurrence and potential impact. 
5 Security Controls are implemented based on the risks identified. 
A proper risk assessment must be conducted to properly ascertain credible threats to DoD 
critical infrastructure.  General security vulnerabilities and man-made disasters are a threat to 
OT.  However, the DoD will need to incorporate advanced persistent threats from nation-states, 
terrorist, and others into their risk assessments.  Attacker objectives will be different in OT than 
IT.  In OT, the objective for an attacker revolves around three objectives: loss, manipulation, and 
denial. A loss of view, control, and safety.  A manipulation of view, control and safety and 
finally the denial of view, control and safety (Conklin, 2018).  A risk assessment flow chart for 





















Figure 2-4 Industrial Control System Risk Assessment Process 
(Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017) 
1. Define Business Objectives “Black Box” Penetration Test 
16.  Sustain 15. Validate 
14. Prioritize & 
Mitigate/Remediat
 
13. Calculate/Rate Risk 
12. Penetration Tests (Validate 
findings and determine “likelihood”) 
11. Attack Tree/Risk Scenario Creation 
10. Attack Vector Assessment 
9. Threat Assessment 
8. Technical Vulnerability Assessment 
7. Controls Analysis 
(Standards Audit, Gap Analysis) 6. Risk Policy Review 
5. Risk Pre-Screen 
4. Network Topology &  
Data Flow Review 3. Asset Identification 




































































































Cyber Command needs to understand what drives security in OT, what best practices are 
exercised by industry, and to identify vulnerabilities in control systems.  Having a firm 
understanding of the current situation will greatly assist Cyber Command in identifying and 
enforcing security standards, and develop a way forward.  Outlined in figure 2-3, The Purdue 
Model helps to logically and physically organize data flow and is governed by the OT Security 
Principles seen in figure 2-2.  Top 20 for ICS are best practices that identify what actions need to 
be taken by industrial control system security professionals.  Again, these security measures 
should be conducted by industry.  If anything, Cyber Command should be receiving and using 
risk assessment to identify where they can assist and enhance the defense of critical infrastructure 






Before the DoD takes a more active role in OT across the nation, a good place to start 
would be its own backyard.  A historical overview of key dates and events that pertain to the 
cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructure will provide the reference material needed to 
address the DoD’s involvement in critical infrastructure.  The idea of securing our nations 
critical infrastructure has been an ongoing concern for a few decades, but a focus to address the 
DoD’s involvement in critical infrastructure is relatively new.   
3.1.1 Historical Overview: 
1998    Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63):  The President of the United States 
established a directive to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure.  The PDD-63 
identified nine sectors that are essential to the government operations and economic 
stability and assigned various lead agencies for each sector (PPD-63, 1998). The National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism was assigned 
to lead this coordinated effort (Martin, 2006). 
1998    International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61508:  An International Standard 
published by the International Electrotechnical Commission.  IEC 61508 covers the 
functional safety of electrical/electronic/ programmable safety-related systems for EUC.  
In simple terms, the IEC 61508 brought awareness and guidance on standardization of 
functional safety to industrial control systems (IEC, n.d.). 
1998    Defense Reform Initiative #49:  Directed DoD Army and Air Force to privatize utility 
systems (DLA, n.d.). 
1998    Department of the Navy (DON) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP):  Secretary 
of the Navy Instruction 3501.1 formally established DON policy, structure, and 
responsibilities for implementing critical infrastructure protection throughout the 
Department of the Navy (Reiter, 2005).  
2001    09/11:  Terrorist organizations successfully plan an attack on the World Trade Centers in 
NYC and the Pentagon. 
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2001    Executive Order 13231: Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. 
Established the National Infrastructure Advisory Committee (NIAC).  A collaboration 
between Federal, state, and private sector through a committee chaired by 30 people of 
influence in various critical infrastructure sectors. The intent is for increased 
collaboration, information sharing, incident coordination, and crisis response as it 
pertains to critical infrastructure (DHS, 2001). 
2002    The Homeland Security Act: A direct result of the 09/11 terrorist attacks.  The 
Homeland Security Act established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
created the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, responsible 
for critical infrastructure protection (Martin, 2006). As of October 2018, there is no 
evidence to support that the directorate is still in operation.  Last available reports are in 
2004. 
2003    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7): Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.  HSPD 7 created the National Infrastructure 
Plan (NIPP) which aimed to unify critical infrastructure protection efforts across the 
country (DHS, 2015).  HSPD 7 was a direct result of the 2002 Homeland Security act 
which gave the prime directive to identify and protect critical infrastructure and key 
resources (CIKR) (DHS, 2015). 
2005    The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Energy Policy Act):  The Energy Policy Act 
established the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), a self-regulatory organization 
with FERC oversight (NERC, 2012).  FERC was given the authority to oversee the 
reliability and security of the power grid.  FERC was also given the authority to approve 
mandatory cybersecurity reliability standards (CERC, 2018).   
2006    Section 215 of the Federal Power Act:  Requires that the ERO develop “mandatory and 
reliability standards, which are subject to FERC review and approval (NERC, n.d.).” 
2006    FERC Order 18 CRF Part 39:  An amendment to Section 215 of the Federal Power 
Act, the FERC developed a certification program outlining electric reliability standards 
the ERO must follow.  These “reliability standards” outlined in Section 215 of the 
Federal Power Act include the cybersecurity protection of Bulk-Power Systems (NERC, 
2006).  Side note, this same year, NERC filed and was later approved to become the ERO 
(NERC, 2012).  
2009    The National Infrastructure Plan (NIPP): Two key developments were borne out of 
the NIPP.  The first was to leverage partnerships to enhance protection and resiliency and 
outline authorities, roles, and responsibilities for: federal, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT), DHS, academia, private owners and operators of critical infrastructure.  
The other primary objective was to provide a Risk Management Framework to increase 
protection of CIKR.  DHS assigned a critical infrastructure Protection Policy 
19 
 
Coordination Committee to ensure coordination of policy relating to CIKR.  However, it 
did not outline authority for DoD critical infrastructure.  Only that the DoD participates 
in National Level Exercises responding to “all-hazards” environment to test NIPP 
protection plans (DHS, 2009). 
2009    DoDI 4170.11:  Mandated metering and energy load management on all DoD facilities. 
The intent was to reduce cost and leverage renewable sustainable energy (DoDI 4170.11, 
2016). 
2010    American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA): 14 billion dollars in grants and 
loans given by the government to push towards a nationwide deployment of smart-grid 
connected homes and companies (DOE, 2012).  7.2 billion dollars in grants and loans to 
expand broadband access (DOE, 2012). 
2010    STUXNET: A small antivirus company named VirusBlockAda uncovered STUXNET, 
one of the most dangerous malware to ever be created.  A malware aimed at industrial 
control systems (Zetter, 2014). 
2012    Presidential Policy Directive 21:  Loosely outlined resiliency and security roles and 
responsibilities of federal, SLTT, owners, and operators of critical infrastructure from 
cyber and physical threats.  PPD 21 stipulated that General Services Administration 
(GSA) and DHS are to ensure contracts include security and resiliency audits for critical 
infrastructure (White House, 2012). 
2013    NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience:  Also 
known as the National Plan, the DHS updated the risk management framework from 
NIPP 2009 and set national priorities through information sharing and collaboration 
between government and industry coordinating councils.  The DHS also stipulated that 
the DoD is to “operate, defend, and ensure the resiliency of DoD-owned or contracted 
critical infrastructure…” (DHS, 2013). 
2014    Air Force Civil Engineer Center-Air Force Cyber Nexus Collaboration (AFCEC-
AFCYBER): A collaboration agreement between the Air Force and industry to work 
together in strengthening the “security of industrial control systems that support critical 
Air Force infrastructures around the world” (Ausley, 2014). 
2014    U.S. Department of Energy Federal Building Metering Guidance: The U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) was mandated by the President to meter Federal buildings 
for energy (electricity, natural gas, and steam) and water (DOE, 2014). 
2015    DoD Cyber Strategy:  Guidance issued by the DoD in developing cyber forces, 
strengthening the nations cyber defensive and deterrent posture.  The Cyber Strategy 
annotates the importance of developing critical infrastructure resiliency through 
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partnerships with owners and operators.  Defending the nation’s critical infrastructure is 
not a top five priority (DoD Cyber Strategy, 2015). 
2016    Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 4170.11: Further iterates privatization of 
utilities (electric, water, wastewater, and natural gas) provided to military installations.  
However, never defines any requirements for privatized utilities to provide security.  This 
DoDI 4170.11 removes itself from a security focus to resiliency focus.  The original 
stance in 2009 when DoDI 4170.11 was originally published clearly gave the DoD the 
responsibility to ensure the security of energy and water resources.  Energy and water 
security were crossed out and replaced with “energy resilience” (DoDI 4170.11, 2016).  
DoDI 4170.11 defines Energy Resilience as “the ability to prepare for and recover from 
energy disruptions that impact mission assurance on military installations” (DoDI 
4170.11, 2016).  DoD installations are to “perform periodic vulnerability assessments and 
audits to assess the risk of energy disruptions on military installations, and implement 
remedial actions to remove unacceptable energy resilience risks” (DoDI 4170.11, 2016).  
Of note, the 2009 4170.11 gave the DoD the mandate to “…investigate off-base utility 
distribution and energy supply systems” (DoDI 4170.11, 2016).  Ultimately 4170.11 
assigns energy resilience to DoD components to ensure that DoD has available and 
reliable power to accomplish its missions from military installations and facilities (DoDI 
4170.11, 2016). 
2018    Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3020.45 (Mission Assurance Construct):  
MA is defined as the ability to conduct all assigned tasks and duties as intended (DON 
CIP, 2009).  DoDI 3020.45 establishes risk management requirements in identifying 
tactical and defense critical assets applicable to Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) and 
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) to accomplish MA.  DCI refers to the “composite of DoD 
and non-DoD assets essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and 
operations worldwide” (DoDI 3020.45, 2018).  DIB refers to government or industry that 
provide research and development, and other critical components for the military (DoD 
Cyber Strategy, 2018). 
2018    Department of Defense Cyber Strategy: Summary of DoD Cyber Strategy.  Critical 
infrastructure becomes a top five objective for DoD.  This strategy leapfrogs other 
publications in regards to critical infrastructure.  “The Department must defend its own 
networks, systems, and information from malicious cyber activity and be prepared to 
defend when directed, those networks and systems operated by non-DoD Defense Critical 
Infrastructure (DCI) and Defense Industrial Base (DIB) entities” (DoD Cyber Strategy, 
2018).  The DoD is to accomplish this by “defend[ing] forward” outlined further in the 
strategy as “[t]he Department seeks to preempt, defeat, or deter malicious cyber activity 
targeting U.S. critical infrastructure that could cause a significant cyber incident 
regardless of whether that incident would impact DoD’s warfighting readiness or 
capability” (DoD Cyber Strategy, 2018). 
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3.1.2 Analysis of the Findings: 
 
The United States slowly began to take the security of its critical infrastructure as a top 
national priority.  Great lengths were taken to develop its stance on the cybersecurity of critical 
infrastructure and was a driving force in the development of a new federal organization, the 
DHS.  While limited in capability due to critical infrastructure being privately owned, the DHS 
slowly began cultivating partnerships in the industry which brought about an increase in 
collaboration.  As threats to critical infrastructure became more prevalent with a more 
interconnected critical infrastructure and the advent of highly sophisticated industrial control 
system malware, has led the DoD to become more involved in the defense of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.  The 2018 Cyber Strategy takes a more offensive posture as the United States 
enters a more complex future environment.  On the heels of the 2018 Cyber Strategy, an 
assessment of key organizations and agencies and their involvement in defending the nation’s 




The Federal Government is composed of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Branches.  Under the Executive Branch, the President oversees the Cabinet and independent 
federal agencies for the enforcement of federal laws (White House, n.d).  The Cabinet is 
comprised of 15 executive departments.  DHS is one of the 15 Cabinet Departments and is 
tasked with the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  The DoD is another one of 15 
departments.  It is the largest agency and it is comprised of the Armed Forces, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency (NSA) (White House, n.d.).  Per 
Cybersecurity Executive Order 13800: “It is the policy of the executive branch to use its 
3.2 WHOSE HOUSE 
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authorities and capabilities to support the cybersecurity risk management efforts of the owners 
and operators of the Nation’s critical infrastructure (as defined in section 5195c(e) of title 42, 
United States Code) (critical infrastructure entities), as appropriate” (White House, 2017).  These 
agencies have officially been charged with the cybersecurity of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure. 
The influence of several government and non-government entities are revealed in the 
historical overview in the DoD involvement in the critical infrastructure.  Over the past several 
decades, many organizations influenced the defensive posture of the United States critical 
infrastructure.  While there are many organizations, outlined below are several key government 
entities that pertain to the security of the United States critical infrastructure. 
 
Department of Homeland Security:  The DHS has 14 Operational and Support 
Components.  The DHS’ National Protection and Programs Directorate is the component 
responsible for securing the nations critical infrastructure.  Specifically the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection.  Per HSPD7 in 2003, the DHS was officially charged with 
securing our nations critical infrastructure (DHS, 2015).  Currently, the DHS has five 
core missions.  Part of its mission is to reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure 
and key resources from terrorist attacks and other hazards.  This is accomplished through 
managing risk via collaboration with public and private owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure.  They provide guidance and a forum to freely exchange information to 
create national programs and policies on critical infrastructure security and resilience 
(DHS, 2016).  National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) 
and The Government Coordinating Council (GCC) is an exemplary product borne from 
the DHS objective of cross-collaboration.  The GCC is a self-organized and self-
governed council that is comprised of 16 key critical infrastructure sectors (DHS, 2018).  
What is important to note, is that the DHS is not charged directly with providing 
cybersecurity to critical infrastructure.    
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):  The FBI’s core mission is to handle domestic 
intelligence and security for the United States.  The FBI has several programs that aid in 
the protection of critical infrastructure.  A crime prevention program called InfraGard 
oversees the collaboration between just the FBI and owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure (InfraGard, n.d.).  In a separate program, the FBI also partners with the 
DHS and private industry in the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC).  The 
DSAC is cross-collaboration between industry and the government to prevent, detect, and 
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investigate criminal acts as it pertains to interstate commerce, including critical 
infrastructure (DSAC, n.d.). 
 
General Services Administration (GSA):  The GSA provides acquisition support for all 
services, equipment, supplies, and IT to government organization and the military.  This 
includes the construction and management of government-owned buildings.  For DoD 
critical infrastructure, they align the acquisition process by developing common 
cybersecurity definitions, ensure any services or products meet the cyber risk 
management strategy and contracts meet the baseline cybersecurity requirements. (GSA, 
2014)  They also oversee the Office of Mission Assurance used to coordinate emergency 
management in the event of a national crisis, including a crisis involving critical 
infrastructure (DHS, 2015). 
 
Department of Defense (DoD):  Under the DoD is the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense which oversees the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, 
Installations, and Environment (ODASD) and subsequently The Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment Installation Energy 
(ODASD(IE)).  ODASD(IE) is responsible for the programs that manage energy and 
water for DoD installation in both the Continental United States (CONUS) and Outside 
the Continental United States (OCONUS) (ODASD(IE), n.d).  They are not energy 
providers.  Their purview includes policy, strategy, and the cybersecurity of DoD facility 
related control systems.  Meaning, the cybersecurity of the energy used to heat, cool, and 
power DoD infrastructure.  Infrastructure includes soldier barracks, office buildings, 
maintenance depots, and more (ODASD(IE), n.d).  The ODASD defines cybersecurity of 
facility related control systems in terms of redundancy.  Redundancy in energy capability 
enables energy resilience.  DoD energy resilience is achieved by outlining the cost of life 
cycle energy solutions coupled with backup energy solutions to enable the military to 
fulfill mission requirements (Castillo, 2017). 
 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA): The Defense Logistics Agency provides supplies to 
the military services.  As it pertains to control systems, the Defense Logistics Agency 
Energy awards and manages the contracts that handle privatizing defense utility systems 
including water, wastewater, power, and natural gas (DLA, n.d). 
National Security Agency (NSA):  The primary job of the National Security Agency is 
to collect foreign intelligence, synthesizing that data, and disseminate to appropriate 
leadership for action.  Cybersecurity of United States communication networks and 
information systems (NSA, n.d.). 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST):  Under the Department of 
Commerce, an executive department of the Cabinet, NIST releases Special Publications 
800-53 and 800-82 to provide baseline security standards for the industrial control 
systems (Conklin, 2016).  These publications assist in identifying typical threats and 
vulnerabilities along with recommended countermeasures for SCADA and DCS systems 
(Stouffer, Lightman, Abrams & Hahn, 2015). 
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC):  Regulates interstate transmission of 
natural gas, oil, and electricity, and audits NERC CIP preparedness against the risk of 
compromise to bulk electric systems (FERC, 2018). NERC CIP – Operates independently 
under the FERC.  NERC CIP’s reliability standards regulate security within the North 
American bulk electric system.  Bulk power systems are high-voltage transmission 
systems above 100kV and those that do not comply are levied with heavy penalties 
(Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  Due to the 2005 Energy Policy Act, 
FERC can make cybersecurity reliability standards mandatory (FERC, 2018).  
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA): Under the DoD, DISA provides 
enterprise services via the Defense Information Systems Network to support the Armed 
Forces enabling Joint Operations (DISA, n.d.).  Simply put, DISA is the gateway for the 
Armed Forces to the internet and the military’s secret network for both strategic and 
tactical networks (DISA, n.d.).  The 2019 Defense Authorization Bill initially involved 
the closure of 27 agencies, DISA among them.  It was later saved in an amendment 
supported by Democrats and the Pentagon (Mitchell, 2018).   
 
 
There is evidence to suggest that cybersecurity of critical infrastructure could have been 
better standardized throughout the DoD.  Reviewing released publications concerning key 
organizations and the DoD’s progression through critical infrastructure history, a pattern begins 
to emerge.  The United States defensive cybersecurity posture begins to display a crawl-walk-run 
pattern.  The end result of the DoD taking a more definitive stance in their role of defending 
critical infrastructure may assist standardizing OT security across the DoD.   
3.3.1 Crawl Phase: 
 
In 1998, the Defense Reform Initiative pushed for the DoD to privatize its critical 
infrastructure.  In 2002, the DoD’s ODASD(IE) released guidance for privatizing DoD utility 
systems. Per the DoD’s own guidance, all Defense Components will complete privatization both 
CONUS and OCONUS infrastructure unless they are exempted by mission requirements.  The 
privatization of DoD critical infrastructure means that the DoD has no ownership of energy, 
3.3 CURRENT SITUATION 
25 
 
water, and other industrial control systems.  “In order to effectuate privatization of the utility 
system, the Military Department must convey all rights in the asset” (ODASD(IE), 2002).  No 
evidence was found that DoD still owned and operated its own critical infrastructure, but 
acknowledges that it does not make it true.  However, the military has predominantly moved 
over to privatized utilities (DLA RFP, 2018).  Thus for DoD critical infrastructure that has been 
privatized, there is no difference between industry and DoD owned critical infrastructure. 
Released Presidential directives in 2002 gave the responsibility of defending the nation’s 
critical infrastructure to the DHS.  In 2004, the DoD’s involvement was limited to DCI asset 
identification through the DoD Protected Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP).  This program 
was later rolled under the 2017 DoDI 3020.45 MA.  Technically, a review of this time frame 
suggests that any critical infrastructure protection provided to DoD critical infrastructure would 
have fallen under the 2005 Energy Policy Act due to the privatization of DoD utilities.  
Interestingly, the DoD Armed Forces each saw its role in defending its critical infrastructure 
differently. 
The Department of the Army:  The largest of the Armed Forces, never stood up a 
program or organization to defend its critical infrastructure. 
 
The Department of the Navy:  The Navy immediately stood up the DON CIP the same 
year the DoD instructed all DoD utilities would be privatized in 1998 (Reiter, 2005).  As 
of 2018, the DON CIP is still in effect.   
 
The Department of the Air Force:  In 2013 the DHS said that the DoD is responsible 
for securing DoD networks.  A year later, the Air Force entered in AFCEC-AFCYBER 
agreement in 2014 (Ausley, 2014).  This partnership with its privately owned critical 
infrastructure was done to collaborate a better defensive posture of Air Force critical 
infrastructure.  
 
3.3.2 Walk Phase:  
 
In 2016, the DoD released DoDI 4170.11 and definitively gave itself some measure of 
responsibility for “energy resiliency,” but not the defense.  The defense of its critical 
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infrastructure was removed, yet the DoD still held the responsibility of performing vulnerability 
assessments and audits (DoDI 4170.11, 2016).  No discrepancy is made in the DoDI 4170.11 
between DoD owned critical infrastructure and privatized DoD critical infrastructure.  In the 
energy sector, technically speaking, any standards or risk mitigation frameworks generated by 
NIST can be enforced by FERC for DoD’s energy critical infrastructure (NERC, 2006)  FERC 
and NIST collaborate to ensure that the incorporation of IT systems into OT architectures are 
implemented securely for all energy-specific control systems (FERC, 2018).  
 
3.3.3 Run Phase:   
 
In 2018 the DoD released the 2018 Cyber Strategy and definitively declared its role in the 
defense of both DoD and non-DoD critical infrastructure.  With the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy 
clearly prioritizing the security of critical infrastructure as a top five priority, there is a clear shift 
in policy in the security of DCI.  Security is redefined as the United States shifts focus from the 
2015 Cyber Strategy.  There is movement from building and developing our cyber force to 
conducting cyberspace operations that enhance U.S. military advantages.  The defense of our 
critical infrastructure was defined in terms of resiliency through critical infrastructure 
partnerships and redundancy in energy infrastructure.  Now the defense of our critical 
infrastructure is focused on the preemptive capability of stopping the malicious cyber activity.  
“Defending U.S. critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity that alone, or as part of a 
campaign, could cause a significant cyber incident” (DoD Cyber Strategy, 2018).   
To defend forward against any threat to our critical infrastructure, regardless of it having 
an impact on our warfighting readiness has bold implications.  The question remains, what does 
this look like?  Will a change in policy drive a more standardized approach to security DCI?  

































Armed Forces, and their respective cyber organizations will provide insight into how the DoD 
could conduct cybersecurity of its critical infrastructure. 
 
3.3.4 DoD Organizational Structure: 
 The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Combatant Commands are governed under Title 
10 - Armed Forces; Subtitle A - General Military Law; Part I–Organization and General Military 
Powers; Chapter 6–Combatant Commands Section 161 – 168. 
Figure 3-1 DoD Armed Forces and Combatant Command Structure 
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The DoD has many departments under it that are not listed in figure 3-1.  While the DoD 
has yet to assign this mission to any particular agency, only a few candidates have the 
appropriate means to assume the mission to defend the United States critical infrastructure.  
While one option could be a defense agency, more plausible choices remain with the Armed 
Forces and Combatant Commands.   
The DoD is tasked with providing military forces with the needs to deter war and ensure 
the nation’s security (DoD, n.d.). The DoD’s mission has extended to include the security of the 
United States critical infrastructure.  To grasp the magnitude of this mission, a quick internal 
overview of just DoD owned assets is in order.  Looking at just the Armed Forces, the DoD 
manages a worldwide real property portfolio valued at over $705 billion (DMDC, 2017). 4,793 
sites reside on 2.2 billion square feet of land.  Of the 275,504 buildings, 23% have been 
privatized or operated by private entities (DMDC, 2017).    The importance of this mission 













DoD has several options in accomplishing its mission to defend the nations critical 
infrastructure.  The first option involves the creation of a Defense Agency and/or Defense Field 
Activities.  Typically defense agencies are used for supporting more than one military 
department when it is more economical or efficient (Cornel Law School, n.d.).  Examples of 
Defense Agency’s include DISA and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s NSA.  DISA is a 
possible option to assume this mission as DISA is a department under the DoD that provides 
tactical and enterprise services to the Armed Forces.  However, DISA’s mission and associated 
skillsets are too different to be a compatible fit for the cyber defense of OT.  In an effort to save 
cost, the 2019 defense bill tried to eliminate DISA and other agencies through organizational 
changes.  With an uncertain future, DISA does not seem a likely candidate to assume this role 
(Mitchell, 2018). Requirements for Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities fall under the 
“combat support agency” under Title 10 (Cornel Law School, n.d.).  The rhetoric used in the 
2018 Cyber Defense Strategy hints at a more offensive posture and may need to extend past the 
restrictions outlined in Title 10 to ensure the security of the United States critical infrastructure.  
It is unlikely the DoD will have any Defense Agency assume the mission of protecting the 
nations critical infrastructure due to Title 10 limitations and compatible skillsets.  
A quick review of figure 3-1 outlines the remaining organizational assets that the DoD 
can leverage short of standing up a new Combatant Command, or Armed Force.   However, 
those are two of the four remaining options: stand up a Combatant Command, stand up a new 
Armed Force, assign this mission to a Combatant Command, or assign this mission to an existing 
4.1 DESIGNATED AUTHORITY 
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Armed Force.  Of those four, it is unlikely that a new Combatant Command or Armed Force will 
occur to accomplish a singular mission.  The 2019 defense bill was trying to eliminate and 
reorganize agencies in an effort streamline efficiencies and cut costs, standing up a new 
Combatant Command or Armed Force is the antithesis of what the House and Senate was trying 
to accomplish (Mitchell, 2018).  Thus, the most likely course of action will be to assign this 
mission to a Combatant Command or Armed Force.  Each Armed Force has a specific way of 
defending its critical infrastructure.  There is little doubt that any Armed Force would want 
another Armed Force to secure their mission readiness.  There is a reasonable assumption that a 
Combatant Command would assume this responsibility and each of the Armed Forces would 
support via a Service Component Command.  The Combatant Command with the most 
compatible skillsets and proper jurisdiction would be Cyber Command.  Within Cyber 
Command, a Joint Task Force could be set up to address this mission, as Joint Task Forces are 
often created to address a single policy concern.   
Cyber Command has influence all over the world supporting Geographic Combatant 
Commanders.   The current structure outlined in figure 3-1, was developed under the UCP.  The 
UCP “establishes missions, responsibilities, and geographic area of responsibilities assigned to 
Geographic Combatant Commanders” (JP 3-0, 2018).  Under the UCP, Cyber Command 
supports other Functional Combatant Commands and Geographic Combatant Commands with 
each Armed Forces cyber unit (CYBERCOM, 2018). 
The Army Cyber Command supports Central Command, Africa Command, and Northern 
Command.   
 
Air Forces Cyber supports European Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. 
Transportation Command.   
 
The Fleet Cyber Command supports Pacific Command and Southern Command.   
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The Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command supports Special Operations Command 
(CYBERCOM, 2018). 
 
Under this structure, Cyber Command is able to carry out the DoD’s intent to “preempt, 
defeat, or deter malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. critical infrastructure…” on a global scale 
(DoD Cyber Strategy, 2018).  Additionally as IT and OT integrate, skillsets found in Cyber 
Command will prove useful.  Review of current trends and options available would lead to Cyber 
Command with each Armed Forces Cyber Service Component to assume this mission. 
 
 
Cyber Command is unfamiliar in this new operational environment.  Offensively, 
Combatant Commanders and Cyber Command will most likely need reevaluate policy as it 
pertains to the forward defense and the rules of engagement.  Clearly defined procedures in 
accordance with Combatant Command’s authorized proper escalation of force.  Defensively, 
Cyber Command needs to address glaring OT issues within the DoD. 
 
 
With a general understanding of challenges faced by OT systems in general, the DoD can 
begin to look at challenges within its organization.  A few possible challenges faced by Cyber 
Command are discussed below. 
 
 
4.2 CYBER COMMAND INITIAL CHALLENGES 
4.3 INTERNAL CHALLENGES 
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4.3.1 Privatization of Critical Infrastructure:   
As it stands, the 2018 Cyber Strategy calls for the defense of DCI.  Which defines DoD 
critical infrastructure as both DoD and non-DoD assets that sustain military forces and 
operations worldwide (DoD Cyber Strategy, 2018).  The DoD has privatized running power, 
water, wastewater, and other services (DoD, 2000).  The new change in policy must take into 
consideration real property held by private industry, the contracts currently in place, and the 
effect on potential mission readiness and national security.  The Department of the Army and 
Department of the Navy have made several attempts to mitigate this impact, but there is no 
standardization across the Armed Forces. 
4.3.2 Standardization Across The Armed Forces:   
With the possible exception of the Navy, the DoD has little experience in understanding 
how to secure OT systems.  The Department of the Navy does have a critical infrastructure 
protection program whose mission is to ensure that both DoD and non-DoD critical 
infrastructure is available to meet the requirements of the Navy’s MA.  (DON CIP, 2009).  While 
evidence suggests that the Navy actually runs its OT, it is not certain.  The Air Force partnered 
with industry via the AFCEC-AFCYBER partnership (Ausley, 2014) while research suggests 
that the Army has no program at all.  Multiple DoD publications and regulations such as the 
2015 NIPP, 4170.11 and 3020.45 all discuss the importance of MA as it pertains to DoD critical 
infrastructure.  Yet each of the Armed Forces displays varying degrees of involvement, which 





4.3.3 Regulations and Policies:   
The ODASD(IE) is charged with the defense of the DoD facility related control systems 
(ODASD, 2017).  The ODASD(IE) defines defense in terms of resiliency per 4170.11 and does 
not conduct actual cyber defense on OT systems that support DoD facilities.  Thus a major factor 
in the DoD’s plan to accomplish MA (outlined by DoDI 3020.45) of OT infrastructure 
supporting 700+ billion dollars in assets as was through energy resilience.  Resilience achieved 
in redundancy in power capability (Castillo, 2017).  When OT security is defined in terms of 
availability, integrity, and continuity, any over-reliance on one security principle over another 
can be just as dangerous.  The integrity of OT cannot be achieved if there is no security measures 
taking place.  The integrity of OT services is jeopardized by current DoD doctrine and 
regulations and thus must be updated.  If not, money will continue to be spent by organizations 
under the DoD operating under the policy that defense is defined by availability and may no 
longer be in compliance with MA as defined by the 2018 Cyber Strategy.   
In addition, the DoD has displayed a great deal of energy in ensuring the availability 
control systems for power, but there is little mention of other control systems, such as water, and 










4.3.4 Uncoordinated Critical Infrastructure Updates:   
 
The integrity of DoD critical infrastructure is further compounded as the United States 
government moves toward the smart grid and stipulates metered programs in an effort to reduce 
cost.  IT convergence into OT infrastructure introduces more vulnerabilities without the 
cybersecurity infrastructure in place to ensure critical infrastructure is secure and reliable.  A 
component of the smart grid is the smart meter.  A feature of the smart meter is the ability to 
disconnect the user from the electric grid without having to send a technician (Zetter, 2010).  In 
2010, the ARRA pushed the United States towards the smart-grid without first ensuring that the 
technology was secure (Zetter, 2014).  The 2014 Federal Building Metering Guidance stipulated 
that security should be used in the data centers that collect metered data from federal buildings, 
but nothing is mentioned about the security of the devices actually reporting the data from the 
control systems (DOE, 2014).  The confidentiality of sensitive data relating to the DoD’s energy 
use needs to be taken into account from end to end.  Metadata related to power consumption of 
2009
•DoDI 4170.11 mandated metering and energy load management, on all DoD facilities. 
(DoDI 4170.11, 2016)
2010
•ARRA $14 billion dollars in grants and loans to update the United States power grid.   
(DOE, 2012)
2014
•The Federal Building Metering Guidance for energy and water.                                          
(DOE, 2014) 
2016
•4170.11 Defines defense of DoD facilities through resiliency and stipulates the installation 
of energy management control systems.                                                                                 
(DoDI 4170.11, 2016)
2018
•Fort Hood Texas installs hybrid solar-wind renewable energy farms covering more than 
132 acres and provide 65 MW of electricity.                                                                             
(DoD SSPP, 2016)
Table 4-1 Uncoordinated Critical Infrastructure Updates 
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DoD real property could unintentionally reveal sensitive information the DoD would rather be 
kept private.  
While the threat from IT to OT is well documented, OT vulnerabilities also provide a 
pivot point for attackers into the IT.  Exemplified in the Target breach in 2013, attackers pivoted 
from metered energy monitors used to reduce energy consumption by heating, ventilation, and 
air conditionings, or HVACs, from a third party company to Targets point-of-sale cash registers 
(Krebs, 2014).  Attackers effectively stealing credit card information by gaining access to 
vulnerabilities in Targets OT network.  If Kim Zetter is accurate about the lack of security in the 
United States governments push towards the smart grid, the potential for threat agents to 
leverage this vulnerability to gain access to DoD networks presents a legitimate security concern. 
4.3.5 The Real Threat to DoD Critical Infrastructure: 
Current evidence may suggest that the ODASD(IE) does not need to invest in the cyber 
defense of DoD facilities. Per an ODASD(IE) report, 45% of power outages at military 
installations were due to equipment failure.  38% of power outages were due to planned 
maintenance, 15% from an act of nature and 2% other (Castillo, 2017).  The report fails to 
disclose the context of these power outages.  If DoD facilities experience less than .01% 
downtime a year, how significant is that 45% of that .01%?  Regardless, the majority of power 
outages to DoD facilities reported by the ODASD(IE) were due to equipment failure and very 
little if any were due to cyber incidents.  A reasonable assumption would suggest older facilities 
and/or equipment need the additional infrastructure for continuity of operations.  This in turn 
gives credence to spend resources on a more robust system rather on defending it. 
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Per the ODASD website, the ODASD actually oversees the DoD’s 880 billion dollar real 
property portfolio of 28 million acres, 500 military installations with over 562,000 buildings and 
structures (ODASD, 2017).   Understand the dollar amount in real property assets provided by 
the Defense Manpower Data Center addressed just the Armed Forces.  These numbers are larger 
as it encompasses all of DoD including the other agencies.  If the DoD is trying to achieve MA, 
and in response the ODASD(IE) is to defend through resiliency per 4170.11, where is there 
concern? 
The concern is the dangerous assumption that the threat to DoD real property lies in 
equipment failure.  Without cybersecurity services to perform log monitoring, intrusion 
detection, or even a honey pot, there is no way of knowing for sure if manipulation of view, 
control, or safety of control systems affected the loss and denial of view, control, and safety of 
DoD facility control systems.  In short, the DoD cannot say that 45% of power outages were due 
to equipment failure because there is no evidence to show that the system itself was not 
compromised. 
Finally, any attacks on DoD critical infrastructure that operates within the continental 
United States and not by another nation-state will need to be apprehended within the confines of 
the law.  Discussed in detail later, Cyber Command operates under Title 10 of the United States 
Code, and thus falls under the Posse Comitatus Act.     
 
 
There are several potential challenges identified that Cyber Command may need to deal 
with external to the DoD.  With the DHS originally tasked with protecting the nation’s critical 
4.4 EXTERNAL CHALLENGES 
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infrastructure, Cyber Command will need to leverage and work with DHS assets and partners to 
fully realize their new directives outlined in the 2018 Cyber Strategy.  However, in dealing with 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure, there is evidence to suggest that the DHS has not 
been as successful as it potentially could be.     
4.4.1 Information Sharing: 
In July 2017, the Navy held a Navy-Private Sector Infrastructure Game designed to 
answer two questions: 
1. When do cyber-attacks reach the level of a national security incident? 
2. When should the DoD (DOD) be involved and in what capacity? 
125 Players from 14 different critical infrastructure sectors across SLTT and federal 
government.  It was determined that private sector companies largely sought to remediate 
impacts on their own networks without government support, but looked to the DHS and the FBI 
for information sharing about threats (Schneider, Schechter & Shaffer, 2017).   It was determined 
cyber-attacks against energy, transportation, communications, water/wastewater, and nuclear 
sectors were declared as a national security incident (Schneider, Schechter & Shaffer, 2017).  
Again, transportation, communications, water/wastewater are barely covered in current DoD 
regulations.  
4.4.2 Implementation of OT Security: 
LTC Nikki L. Griffin Olive conducted a study with the United States Army War College 
and came to the conclusion that the DHS has cultivated strong relationships with owners and 
operations of critical infrastructure, but achieved relatively little successes in implementation and 
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enforcement of developed security standards and policy (Griffin, 2013).  Interestingly, two years 
later, a similar research was conducted by David Riedman with the Navy Postgraduate School. 
David Riedman’s research suggests incongruities in defined definitions has led to a 
mismanagement of personnel and resources.  His study suggests the DHS views its mission to 
defend critical infrastructure facilities different than what federal policies dictate as critical 
infrastructure (Riedman, 2015).  Federal policies state that critical infrastructures are facilities or 
assets that when damaged or destroyed would have a national impact on that nation’s economic 
security, health, or safety.  The DHS sees its mission in protecting all critical infrastructure 
(Riedman, 2015).  In doing so, DHS is negligent in fulfilling its duties to protect critical 
infrastructure and mishandling resources and effort.  The researcher suggests that DHS needs to 
relook at what is defined as critical, per federal policy and ensure it meets the criteria (Riedman, 
2015).  
4.4.3 Information Dissemination: 
Each sovereign state and subdivision has created a critical infrastructure cybersecurity 
and resiliency program.  Mason Bradford with the Naval Post Graduate School conducted an 
anonymous online program evaluation survey of critical infrastructure professionals across the 
nation in reference to their perception regarding the state and local government’s critical 
infrastructure cybersecurity program.   Mr. Bradford’s research finds several incongruities.  First, 
is a lack of funding and a lack of dedicated personnel to conduct critical infrastructure 
cybersecurity.  Second, is that the lack of consistency in cybersecurity critical infrastructure 
programs among the states (Mason, 2015).  The Third incongruity Mr. Bradford also sheds light 
on the disparity between federal and state, organization and classification, between emergency 
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management and critical infrastructure protection.  At the federal level, emergency management 
and critical infrastructure protection are seen as two discreet parallel workflows (Mason, 2015).  
However, at the state and local level, it was found that emergency management and critical 
infrastructure protection programs blend together.  He suggests that states standardize a parallel 
and discreet workflow of emergency management and critical infrastructure protection.  Doing 
so would help streamline goals of secure and resilient national critical infrastructure (Mason, 
2015). 
Reviewing Mr. Mason’s research, it would appear that there is a communication 
breakdown between controls and risk mitigation strategy from leadership to the operator of 
control systems. The DHS has put together NIAC and the GCC.  Organizations whose purpose is 
to align cybersecurity objectives and mitigate some of the concerns presented in this research.  
More research needs to be conducted to validate if this collaboration between industry leaders is 
providing the change needed at the lowest level.  Additionally, to counter Mr. Mason’s second 
concern, it is important to understand that compliance does not necessarily equal security 
(Conklin, 2017). At some point, it is recommended that security objectives be tailored to the 
specific industrial control environment based off of the OT Security Principles in figure 2-2. 
Finally, it is important to bring up that this is new territory for the DoD.  Previously, the 
DHS had the lead in defending our critical infrastructure through partnerships and exercises 
(DHS, 2016).  These exercises were primarily used to establish procedural responses to 
disruptions in services provided by critical infrastructure (Nailor, 2018).  Now, the DoD is 
charged with defending our critical infrastructure in a more active posture.  Partnerships will 
need to be cultivated and federal guidelines may be necessary to mark the point of demarcation 






Around 2005-2006, a nation-state began an offensive cyber campaign designed to 
infiltrate, pilfer, and sabotage industrial control systems against another sovereign nation (Zetter, 
2014). It was one of the largest cyber campaigns ever uncovered and it developed some of the 
most dangerous malware ever created, the most famous of which is called STUXNET.  This was 
not an attack on traditional IT systems.  The end goal was not for financial or political gain, but 
rather to cripple the offensive capability of another nation.  The DoD cannot underestimate the 
implications and importance of a cyber campaign aimed at OT.  While most cybersecurity 
experts are familiar with IT systems and the consequences attacks on traditional IT infrastructure 
can have, a lot of security professionals are not as familiar with OT.   
Countries including China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Japan, Israel, the UK, and more all 
have cyber warfare programs.  China began developing its offensive capabilities in the late 1990s 
(Zetter 2014).  At least 29 countries have dedicated intelligence or military units for offensive 
cyber operations (Lendvay, 2016). The militarization of cyber-space is not a new concept.  In 
fact, an attack on the United States critical infrastructure is not a new idea either.  In 2001, 
hackers appearing to originate from China broke into the California Independent System 
Operator, or Cal-ISO, through two unprotected servers.  Cal-ISO manages industrial control 
systems that move electricity throughout most of California.  Had a successful breach occurred, 
electrical services for the state would have been in jeopardy (Zetter, 2014).  In 2002, United 
States forces in Afghanistan found that Al-Qa'eda had plans to conduct cyber-attacks on dams, 
using software that could be used to simulate its failure (Harnden, 2002).  What is new is the 
5.1 ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT: THE STUXNET DILEMMA 
41 
 
United States policy in the nation’s defense of its critical infrastructure and the digital arms race 
among countries that equalizes the landscape of cyberwarfare.  Enter The Olympic Games.   
The Conficker worm infected more than 6 million machines was only 35 kilobytes in 
size.  Most malware is roughly 5 kilobytes in size (Zetter, 2014).  STUXNET was 1.18 
megabytes in size.  Per Kaspersky Labs, Flame, was 20 megabytes in size, more than 650,000 
lines of code and 20 times more complicated than STUXNET (Zetter, 2012). It took Symantic 
and various other Antivirus firms two years to fully understand STUXNET.  Kaspersky Labs 
estimated it would take 10 years to fully understand Flame (Zetter, 2012). Aptly code-named 
Olympic Games, “Flame,” “Duqu,” and “STUXNET” were extremely sophisticated malware in a 
long and successful five year classified campaign aimed at crippling Iran’s covert nuclear 
weapons program (Nakashima, Miller & Tate 2012). 
5.1.2 Flame: 
Before STUXNET, before Duqu, there was Flame.  Flame was an extremely 
sophisticated espionage tool composed of about 20 modules that would only install malware 
modules as necessary (Zetter, 2014).  It commanded an incredibly large 80 command and control 
domains that encrypted all data. Only 1,000 victims were struck by flame, systems infected with 
Flame resided in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, and other counties in the surrounding region, 
suggesting targets were pre-identified (Zetter, 2012).  Used to collect intelligence in preparation 
for STUXNET, Flame secretly mapped and monitored Iran’s computer networks (Nakashima, 
Miller & Tate 2012).  Flame spread via the same vulnerabilities as STUXNET, but did not 
replicate unless given the command by a command and control server (Zetter, 2012).  What is 
most interesting about Flame, was the “God-mode exploit.”  Flame had vast computational 
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resources, and extensive knowledge of the Microsoft ecosystem to create a legitimate signed 
hash transferred to the attacker’s falsified digital certificate (Zetter, 2014).  Digital certificates 
are used to authenticate a programs trustworthiness from legitimate companies.  The falsified 
digital certificate attack was described by cryptology researcher, Marc Stevens, as a brilliant feat 
of mathematics achieved by world-class cryptographers (Zetter, 2014). 
5.1.3 Duqu: 
Before there was STUXNET, there was Duqu.  It is estimated that Duqu was released as 
early as August 2007, three years before STUXNET was discovered.  Duqu, was a Remote 
Access Trojan used to steal information related to industrial control systems across an intricate 
command and control network (Symantec, 2011).  Duqu would exploit machines at kernel level 
by taking advantage of a TrueType font-parsing vulnerability.   Microsoft uses TrueType to 
determine how a character should look on screen (Symantec, 2011).  Every new machine Duqu 
infected, had its own command and control proxy server, segmenting information to ensure no 
one would get the complete picture if compromised (Zetter, 2014).  Using proxy servers 
provided a level of confidentiality to the attackers, as they are used to redirect traffic to another 
location while keeping the user anonymous.  Attackers were particularly interested in AutoCAD 
files used for drafting 2D and 3D architectural blueprints and mapping out computer networks 
and machinery on plant floors (Zetter, 2014).  Duqu, designed for espionage, deleted all 
information about itself after the 30th day of infection to reduce the possibility of compromise.  
Duqu did not replicate (Symantec, 2011).  In the end, only about 36 machines were found with 
Duqu, predominately in Iran and Sudan (Paganini, 2012).  Research into STUXNET and Duqu 
had several common denominators that link them together.  Depending on the version of Duqu 
used, the drivers used by both malware were compiled on the same date and signed with the 
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same RealTek digital certificate (Zetter, 2014).  Drivers found in both malware used algorithms 
and keys with shared similarities, and analysis of the log files of some of the victims revealed 
AutoCAD data related to industrial control systems used in various industries in Iran (Zetter, 
2014).  Duqu and STUXNET had different objectives but the same end goals, debilitating Iran’s 
covert nuclear weapons program.     
5.1.4 STUXNET: 
On June 24th, 2010, a small antivirus company named VirusBlockAda would be the 
undoing of an extremely successful five-year cyber espionage campaign run by nation-state that 
created one of the most dangerous malware to date (Zetter, 2014).  VirusBlockAda uncovered a 
malware that would later be known as STUXNET and unwittingly ushered the world into a new 
digital arms race.  It could be likened to the nuclear arms race that began in 1945 when the 
United States dropped a nuclear bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima (History, 2018).  
STUXNET was a kernel level rootkit designed to sabotage and exploit vulnerabilities in 
an industrial control system that enriches U-235 isotopes (Lendvay, 2016).  History suggests that 
STUXNET was the first rootkit designed for an industrial control system (Zetter, 2014).  
STUXNET was used to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons at a covert facility in 
Natanz, but would ultimately end up infecting over 300,000 systems in over 100 countries 
(Lendvay, 2016).  Where Flame and Duqu were controlled, STUXNET left victims all over the 
world.  Surprisingly, the internet was not used to spread this malware and spread only via 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) and local network connections (Zetter 2014). 
At the time when more than 12 million malware programs were captured a year by 
Symantec, only twelve or so zero-days would be found among them (Zetter, 2014).  A zero-day 
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refers to a vulnerability or exploitable gap in a computer program known only to an attacker, and 
unknown to the developer or general public (Lendvay, 2016).  STUXNET used five.  Five zero-
day attacks to gain access, escalate privileges, and spread (Zetter, 2014).   
 Vulnerability Exploited 
1 Windows keyboard file to gain escalated privileges 
2 Windows print-spooler functions to spread between machines sharing a printer 
3 Windows .LNK files that spread via USB 
4 Windows Server Service RPC Handling 
5 Buffer-overflow in the wallpaper of Windows (Zetter, 2014) 
 
STUXNET used up to eight different propagation methods, and would take several steps 
to ensure proper installation and deployment.  After STUXNET took root on the system, it would 
immediately check the antivirus and modified itself accordingly.  If STUXNET could not bypass 
the antivirus scanner it immediately stopped and shut itself down.  STUXNET would then install 
a driver to infect any other USB connected to its system for the next 21 days before installing its 
layers upon layers of encrypted dynamic link library and configuration file.  A dynamic link 
library is a repository of commonly used programs by the operating system or other applications 
(Zetter 2014).  The developers of STUXNET had a deep understanding of the OT Systems used 
in the Natanz facilities. 
If the machine did not fit the very specific conditions it needed, then STUXNET would 
shut itself down.  STUXNET was targeting machines with very specific configurations of 
proprietary control system software that ran on top of Windows Operating system, acting as an 
intermediary between the Windows Operating System and the Siemens Step 7 software.  
Specifically the S7-315 and S7-417 of Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 software (Zetter, 2014).  All in 
an effort to bypass a physical gap between the control network and the enterprise network.  
Table 5-1 STUXNET Zero-Day Attacks  (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017) 
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Waiting for a programmer with STUXNET on his machine to physically connect to a Siemens 
PLC.  STUXNET would then record legitimate PLC commands for 14 days before mimicking 
them back to the operators while secretly executing its rogue commands (Zetter, 2014).  One 
such rogue command disabled safety systems generated every 100 milliseconds by altering 
OB35 code sent by the PLC.  OB35 is used to indicate if a turbine is operating outside of 
tolerable conditions (Zetter, 2014). 
STUXNET was an intricately crafted malware, obscuring the way it executed code by 
using the code, inside another block of code in the process of being executed.  Then, take that 
same code being processed and process it in another block of code being executed (Zetter, 2014). 
STUXNET would monitor its power consumption and utilization of computational resources.   
Set up file-sharing servers on client machines and infect backend data-bases to ensure each 
system was infected with the most up-to-date STUXNET version.  Perhaps the most impressive 
accomplishment of them all was that STUXNET, Flame, and Duqu went undetected for five 
years. 
STUXNET was a surgical attack with very specific goals and objectives.  Any attack 
taken on an actual industrial control system would not need to be so sophisticated or require such 
skill.  An attacker would not need malware as dangerous as STUXNET, just a simple 4 kilobyte 
virus can have devastating consequences.  As stated before, an attack on the nation’s critical 
infrastructure is not a new concept.   
5.1.5 The Olympic Games: 
The United States must remain vigilant against credible threats agents.  Whoever was 
behind STUXNET, Duqu, and Flame cannot assume that they are the only ones with 
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sophisticated malware, but they are the first to show their hand.  A challenge has been given, and 
nation-states, terrorists, and hacktivists are sure to rise to the challenge.  Since STUXNET, there 
has been a rise in interest in exploiting critical infrastructure.  Vupen, a security firm that sells 
zero-day exploits to nation-states has seen an increase in requests for critical infrastructure 
(Zetter, 2014).   
In 2012, Telvent, a Canadian industrial automation company specializing in SCADA 
systems for various energy producing industries, was hacked by attackers linked to the Chinese 
Military (Krebs, 2012).  The Chinese Military stole project files for SCADA systems they 
produced and managed for their customers.  Of note, one project file stolen was for a product for 
energy firms for smart grid technology to be backwards compatible with legacy assets (Krebs, 
2012). 
In 2013, Iran had compromised the command-and-control system of the Rye Brook Dam 
in New York using a cellular modem.  The incident was not reported by the United States until 
2016, but speculation was it could have been a test run for a larger dam in the United States 
(Berger, 2016).  Ransomware is even making its way into OT systems as well.  As early as 2013, 
ransomware hit a mining company’s industrial control network.  The operator paid over 100 
thousand dollars to regain access to the HMIs (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  
Per the Washington Post, North Korea was apparently behind the infamous WannaCry 
ransomware attack that affected over 230,000 computers in over 150 countries in early 2017 
(Nakashima & Rucker, 2017).  It would not be a hard sell to see North Korean attackers pivot 
into industrial control systems.   
47 
 
According to IBM’s Managed Security Services Data, attacks on industrial control 
systems rose 110% from 2015 to 2016.  60% of those attacks were against the United States 
critical infrastructure (McMillen, 2016).   
China’s Telvent Hack was an attempt to gather data on SCADA systems used in critical 
infrastructure around the world.  Nation-states have plans and counter-plans just as the United 
States.  A lot of effort went into sabotaging another nation’s critical infrastructure. How much 
further would they be willing to go if it was the United States?   
Will there be further ramifications and retaliation when Iran and North Korea acquire 
offensive cyber capabilities seen by STUXNET, Duqu, and Flame?  As with STUXNET, Flame, 
and Duqu, no one has claimed ownership, and proving attribution in cyber can be difficult.  To 
prove attribution, a forensic analysis of static and live data is helpful to ascertain the “who, what, 
when, why, and how.”  Should industry decide to take legal action, any evidence gleaned from a 
forensics analysis needs to be handled appropriately to be used as evidence in the court of law 
(Ahmed, Naedele, Obermeier, & Richard, 2012). The intricacy of forensic analysis is a separate 
topic, but it is still an important issue that would be remiss if not brought to light.  As SCADA 
forensics is still a relatively new field, with few if any guidelines available (Ahmed, Naedele, 
Obermeier, & Richard, 2012).   
Academia has proposed some frameworks.  Researchers attending the 2013 Industrial 
Control System and Cyber Security Research proceedings detailed a proposed method using IT 
forensic techniques on SCADA servers (Wu, Pagna Disso, Jones & Campos, 2013).  Lewis 
Folkerth with the SANS Technology Institute was able to develop some techniques for forensic 
analysis that was tested on a live ICS that resulted in successful recovery and detection after the 
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incident, but not attribution (Folkerth, 2015).  If Cyber Command fails to defend the nation’s 
critical infrastructure, how will attribution be determined?  How attribution will impact 



















6.1.1 Critical Infrastructure Protection Teams: 
Industrial control system Cybersecurity professionals require a set of unique skills 
beyond networking hardware and operating systems commonly found in most enterprise 
businesses. It is a multidiscipline understanding of control systems coupled with physics and 
engineering requirements of industrial control processes (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & 
Wilhoit, 2017).   
6.1.2 Training:  
While the opinions of this author are that Cyber Command should not defend OT networks 
and systems outlined in Zones 0-3, there are some tools commonly found in IT networks are also 
useful in OT networks, while others are OT specific.  Just as the Army has Soldiers with 
specialized designated skill sets, so too must the industrial control system cybersecurity 
professional.  Categorized and listed below are common control system tools that can assist the 
next generation of industrial control system security professionals.  This is not a comprehensive 
list, but rather some suggestions on skill sets that could be cultivated depending on the level of 
partnership agreement the Cyber Command has with the owner or operators of the control 
system. 
Network Monitoring:  Devices in OT networks communicate in a pre-defined manner.  
Data flow is predetermined and identification and monitoring of proper data across the 
OT network is possible with programs like Snort, Suricata, and the Brother Network 
Security Monitor (Conklin, 2017).   
6.1 THE WAY FORWARD 
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Asset Identification: WireShark, Grassmarlin, or Sophia. Grassmarlin is a free NSA tool 
used by industrial control system networks to identify devices on the network and extract 
the data they contain (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).    
Vulnerability Assessment: Several open source, online tools, can be utilized to 
determine what OT device has what vulnerability.  Examples include the National 
Vulnerability Database, Common Exposures Database and ICS-CERT advisories 
(Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  A great tool provided for free by 
DHS is The Cyber Security Evaluation Tooltool or CSET that provides a comprehensive 
vulnerability overview of industry specific industrial control systems  (ICS-CERT, 2016).  
Asks questions about policy, risk, stakeholders, and detailed questions as it pertains to the 
sector operated in. 
Configuration Review: OT security professionals will need a control system baseline 
with hardware configurations, copies of current ladder logic programs and a list of all 
devices attached to the OT network (Folkerth, 2015). There are several automated tools 
that assist with ensuring that common devices found in the industrial control system are 
as a secure as possible.  Examples include Nipper and Nessus (Bodungen, Singer, 
Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).   
Penetration Testing (Pentesting):  Penetration testing is used in conjunction with a risk 
assessment, to validate the current cybersecurity posture, or verify security controls are 
operating as intended (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017).  When 
conducting penetration testing in an OT environment, it should be virtualized.  If, on the 
rare occasion that the control system has a lab or a mini replicated system for research 
and development that can simulate the real-world control system, then use if available.  
Some tools, Shodan.io, Kali Linux, Scans.io, Censys.io (Conklin, 2017).  If this cannot be 
done, and leadership still wants a pentest done to complete a valid risk assessment, then 
clear rules of engagement must be developed, understood and risk accepted by a 
designated approving authority (Bodungen, Singer, Shbeeb, Hilt & Wilhoit, 2017). 
Tools outlined above are useless unless control system security professionals know what 
they are looking for.  Wireshark, a useful tool for packet analysis and asset identification, is a 
free tool that can assist critical infrastructure protection teams in performing deep packet 
analysis.  Packets that may contain protocols for OT systems where there should not be.  If the 
DMZ is configured appropriately, there should not be protocols used in control systems outside 
of Zones 0-3.  Protocols in zones 0-3 will all be predefined so anomalies tend to stick out.  
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Logging is another action that should be taken by control system security professionals to log 
events and protocols.  
Control system security professionals will need to have a plan to handle incidents and 
responses to OT networks.  A dedicated team with specialized skill sets outlined earlier will need 
to be trained and need to work together. A perfect resource is The Idaho National Lab.  They 
have a full-scale electric power grid that is dedicated to controlling system cybersecurity 
assessment, standards improvements, and training (Ahmed, Naedele, Obermeier, & Richard, 
2012). 
The DoD is not without support in its new-found mission to defend the United States’ 
critical infrastructure.  The Armed Forces, DHS, Cyber Command, pre-established partnerships 
with industry stakeholders, ODASD(IE), NIST, policy, financial support, and others.  Cyber 
Command has a slew of support both internal to the DoD and external, that it needs to leverage if 
Cyber Command is to be successful in defending the nation’s critical infrastructure.  The 
challenge will be to consolidate, organize, and restructure as appropriate.  Support available to 
Cyber Command is outlined below.   
6.2.1 Policy and Funds: 
Policies such as the DoDI 4170.11, 3020.45 and DoD Directive 30.20.40 are all 
directives that had some great frameworks and tools that can still be leveraged.  The National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 provides funding for the Secretary of 




DoD (NDAA, 2017).  Surprisingly, there is also funding to prevent Electromagnetic Interference 
(EMI) and radio frequency weapons (RFWs) to our critical infrastructure (NDAA, 2017).  The 
use of RFWs is an entirely separate topic, however it should be noted that RFWs can potentially 
be used to affect, remote terminal units, actuators, and other systems that use wireless for 
communication to have unintentional consequences, valve closures, disabled communications, 
false data transmissions, and damage to the electronic device itself to name a few (TSWG, 2005).  
It is interesting to note that per the 2017 NDAA the United States authorizes funds to address the 
need to answer Russia’s doctrine with respect to targeting adversary critical infrastructure 
(NDAA, 2017). 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 provides funding for assistance 
via the Armed Forces, DoD civilians employees and subject matter experts in industry and 
government to assist the DoD in the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. The 2018 NDAA 
also stipulates that they are to conduct appropriate cybersecurity review of existing systems and 
infrastructure as well as acquisition plans for proposed systems and infrastructure. 
6.2.2 Armed Forces: 
Cyber Command’s Air Forces Cyber and the Navy has already made some headway into 
OT.  However, the National Guard is a potential asset Cyber Command could leverage.   
Christopher Baker thought of using the National Guard as an option available to DoD in enabling 
the transition of shared information and collaboration in defending critical infrastructure.  In a 
rare case, the Michigan National Guard is at the forefront in industrial control system 
cybersecurity.  The Michigan National Guard built a cybersecurity range to meet the 
cybersecurity needs of prevention, protection, mitigation, and response to cyber incidents (Baker, 
2015). The Michigan Public Service Commission even collaborates with critical infrastructure 
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owners and operators to protect energy control systems from cyber-attacks that could jeopardize 
public health and safety (Baker, 2015). As the Guard falls under Title 32 and not Title 10, it 
could operate in some form of state authority.  It would require some coordination between 
federal entities and various state Title 32 leadership to conform to a streamlined alignment of 
National Guard CIP capabilities across the states (Baker, 2015). 
Another benefit the DoD has with National Guard partnership, is that the National Guard 
does not fall under the Posse Comitatus Act, which enables the National Guard to perform police 
functions.  Theoretically, the National Guard could not only “defend OT networks, but search for 
and apprehend offenders that infiltrate CIKR networks” (Baker, 2015). This could give the DoD 
the ability to legally respond to incidents inside the continental United States and legitimize the 
2018 Cyber Strategy’s defensive posture internal to the United States.  What is key to 
differentiate is that with the National Guard, the potential of having civilian critical infrastructure 
owners and operators as subject matter experts in the fight is invaluable.  With the limited 
experience DoD has in this field, leveraging National Guard Assets like in Michigan could prove 
fruitful. 
Of note, this does not absolve critical infrastructure owners and operators of the 
responsibility to safeguard their OT systems, but rather enables their critical infrastructure 
protection teams to have additional help and resources in defending their OT networks. 
In the same manner of collaboration with the National Guard, the DoD could leverage the 
Federal Reserve Forces.  Doing so would enable warrior citizens working in the local community 




Cyber Command should continue to cultivate the relationships built by DHS with 
industry to better enhance collaboration.  These relationships have led to several OT cyber 
exercises that have better postured the United States to defend and respond to cyber-attacks 
against industrial control systems.  A great example of leveraging partnerships with industry and 
the United States government is the DoD’s Cyber Guard.  Perhaps the largest annual critical 
infrastructure exercise conducted by the DoD includes Cyber Command, DHS, and the FBI. The 
DoD conducts an annual exercise program with DHS and the FBI for contingencies against cyber 
threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure on a massive scale.   Purpose is to have a “whole-of-
nation response” to a massive cyberattack to the United States critical infrastructure (Cyber 
Guard, 2016).  The exercise provides innovative approaches to defending United States critical 
infrastructure, integration of industry and federal support, training, and situational understanding 
(Cyber Guard, 2016). 
The NCCIC’s Cyber Storm is another great example of collaboration with industry.  The 
NCCIC’s primary function is to promote shared situational awareness of malicious cyber activity 
against the United States critical infrastructure and key resources (Zetter, 2014).  One of the 
ways the NCCIC does this is through a digital exercise called Cyber Storm.  A biennial exercise 
to answer the critical question: “How would government agencies and critical infrastructure 
owners and operators respond to an attack against national critical infrastructure?” (NCCIC, 
2018) The exercise involved more than 1,000 participants (or “players”) around the globe, from 
various federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities.  This exercise was executed online 
to allow players to participate from their work location.  The exercise is not technical, but more 
operational focused, working out the process and procedures for proper collaboration of 
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information and responses (Nailor, 2018).  The federal government’s partnership with industry 
has been beneficial in getting support from key leaders in enhancing the cybersecurity of OT 
systems.   
Cyber Command also has the benefit of the DHS establishing support within the 
Government to defend the nation’s critical infrastructure.  The FBI provides a domestic legal 
sanction to prosecute attacks committed by individuals that reside within the continental United 
States (FBI, n.d.).  The FBI’s Cyber Division, the DSAC and InfraGard program are perfect 
assets to compliment Cyber Commands ability to protect the nations critical infrastructure in a 
legal and authorized manner. 
As Cyber Command continues to gain operational understanding of the threat 
environment affecting OT systems, a symbiotic relationship should be cultivated with the 
Department of Commerce’s NIST.  As threats to OT infrastructure are better understood, Cyber 
Command and NIST can enhance the quality and maintain the relevance of special publications 
for threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures in SCADA and DCS infrastructures.  These 
special publications released by NIST has some recommendations for OT in facilities and 
buildings such as fire alarms, lights, physical access control, building management control 
systems and more (Stouffer, Lightman, Abrams & Hahn, 2015).  A partnership between NIST, 
the ODASD(IE) and Cyber Command could help strengthen the ODASD(IE)’s policy, strategy, 
and cybersecurity of DoD facility related control systems.  
While critical infrastructure plays a strategic role in our nation’s security, the United 
States must focus on key resources and key points of interest to have any kind of effective 
security.  The DHS and the DoD cannot defend every network and system that operates under its 
56 
purview.  The attack surface is too large to defend against all threats and too vast to close all 
vulnerabilities (Hackney, n.d.).  The United States must identify, prioritize, and defend its most 
important assets (Riedman, 2015).  However, the United States cannot let other vulnerabilities go 
by the way side either.  A careful balance must be struck while empowering others through 
shared knowledge and assistance to defend its OT systems must become a priority. 
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CHAPTER 7
The DoD operates predominately in the IT domain, not in OT.  Historically speaking, the 
DoD has little involvement in securing OT used in critical infrastructure.  In the 2018 Cyber 
Security Strategy, the cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructure has evolved from a 
passive defense through collaborative partnership with industry owners and operators to a more 
aggressive “defend forward” posture.  However, the DoD has yet to address who in the DoD will 
assume the mission to defend the nations critical infrastructure, and how it will be accomplished.  
This research addressed these questions and the reasons leading up to the DoD’s sudden change 
in policy.  The findings of this research is as follows: 
1. Cyber Command is best positioned to assume the mission to defend the nation’s
critical infrastructure.
2. Cyber Command will need to address several internal challenges before moving
forward. Key challenges:
a. DoD regulations and policies concerning the cybersecurity of OT must be
updated.
b. Updated OT cybersecurity regulations and policies must standardize and
enforce baseline OT security requirements across the DoD.
c. Updates and additions to DCI capability must first ensure that baseline
cybersecurity requirements are met.
3. Cyber Command will need to have a dedicated OT specialized protection teams with
the following support:
a. Trained OT security professionals with a basic understanding of the OT
environment and the associated skillset needed to defend a network they
cannot touch.
7.1 CO NCLUSION 
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b. Clearly defined boundaries and rules of engagement.  Depending on Cyber
Command’s aggressiveness in its role to defend DCI, recommendations are to
operate only in level 4 and 5 of the Purdue Model.
c. Partnerships with DHS, FBI, NIST, FERC, SLTT and industry must continue
to work together for collaboration and training exercises.
Cyber Command will need to deal with external challenges of managing the protection of 
the nation’s critical infrastructure.  Advanced persistent threats, originating from nation-states, 
are developing cutting-edge malware aimed at exploiting vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure 
and key resources.  With the advent of STUXNET, a new digital arms race has been launched, 
but the manner in which this arms race is conducted has yet to be truly understood or seen.  
Nation-states are stealing information related to control systems and security firms are being 
solicited to find vulnerabilities in OT for future exploitation.  Even ransomware is beginning to 
emerge in OT.  As General Oderieno once stated, we are indeed entering a more complex future 
environment.   
However, the United States Government has the infrastructure and systems in place to 
affect change from the top down.  Industry and government best practices like the Purdue Model, 
Top 20 for ICS, and Special Publications provide a good foundation to apply OT cybersecurity 
based off AIC security principles.  The DHS has established partnerships in both government 
and industry that can be leveraged by Cyber Command.  Whatever actions conducted by the DoD 
to defend the nation’s critical infrastructure, must be done within the confines of the law. Should 
an attack on our critical infrastructure occur within the nation’s borders, Cyber Command could 
leverage the FBI or possibly the National Guard for prosecution.  Appropriate responses to threat 
agents located OCONUS attacking, sabotaging, or conducting espionage to the nation’s critical 
infrastructure should be clearly defined in the rules of engagement.   
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Whatever the future holds, the United States leadership needs to understand the 
ramifications of any actions taken under the 2018 Cyber Defense Strategy will have 
repercussions.  That when it comes to critical infrastructure, the United States has the most to 
lose. 
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS: 
AFCEC-AFCYBER – Air Force Civil Engineer Center-Air Force Cyber Nexus Collaboration 
AIC – Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality 
CIA – Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
CIKR – Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
CIP - Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CONUS – The Continental United States 
CRC – Cyclic Redundancy Checks 
DCI – Defense Critical Infrastructure 
DCIP – DoD Protected Critical Infrastructure Program 
DCS – Distributed Control System 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security 
DIB – Defense Industrial Base 
DISA – Defense Information Systems Agency 
DLA – Defense Logistics Agency 
DMZ – Demilitarized Zone 
DNP3.0 – Distributed Network Protocol 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DoDI – Department of Defense Instruction 
DOE – Department of Engery 
DON – Department of the Navy 
DON CIP – Department of the Navy Critical Infrastructure Program 
DSAC – Domestic Security Alliance Council 
EUC – Equipment Under Control 
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FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FERC – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
FERC – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
GCC – Government Coordinating Council 
GSA - General Services Administration 
HMI – Human Machine Interface  
HSPD – Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
ICCP – Inter Control Center Protocol 
IEC – International Electrotechnical Commission 
IT – Information Technology 
MA – Mission Assurance 
NCCIC – National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
NDAA – National Defense Authorization Act 
NIAC – National Infrastructure Advisory Committee 
NIPP – National Infrastructure Plan 
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NSA – National Security Agency 
OCONUS – Outside the Continental United States 
ODASD – The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and 
Environment 
ODASD(IE) – The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and 
Environment Installation Energy 
OT – Operational Technology 
PDD – Presidential Decision Directive 
PDU – Protocol Data Units 
PLC – Programmable Logic Controller 
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RFW – Radio Frequency Weapons 
RTU – Remote Terminal Units 
SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SIS – Safety Instrumented Systems 
SLTT – State, local, tribal, and territorial 
TCP – Transmission Control Protocol 
UCP – Unified Command Plan 
UDP – User Datagram Protocol 
USB – Universal Serial Bus 
VFD – Variable Frequency Drive 
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